ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
conomic and financial crisis (2008) (2009) ) had a profound impact not only on U.S economy but also on the global economy as well. Seeds of global financial crisis (GFC henceforth) can be traced to good times when Federal Reserve reduced Fund rate from 6.5% to 1.75% from May 2000 to December 2001. This definitely spurred a lot of liquidity along with large foreign capital inflows. This combination along with financially engineered products created perfect times for financial boom and perfect ground for the doom in the years to come. Most of the major financial giants like Merill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citibank, Wells Fargo and Washington Mutual had deep roots in financially engineered products and securitization process. Ultimately good times ended and history revealed that, most of the perceived safe and sound financial institutions were not properly insulated from financial risk as they should have been. Good times of lower interest rates ended and Fed increased fund rate to 5.25% by 2006. Large number of bankruptcy applications were filed by mortgage loan borrowers and chain of defaults started taking place. This had reflective impact on other financial institutions around the globe as well, and thus exhibiting the phenomenon of contagion. All the major economies of the world in one way or the other were affected by the GFC. In summary the main causes of the crisis were high rise in housing demand, high defaults on low quality loans, increase in origination of mortgage backed securities (MBS), easily available credit with less supervision and due diligence and soft regulatory structure, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex financial products, high leveraged strategies, inadequate attention to known risk elements and relaxation in following domestic and international financial regulatory rules and principles.
The impact of GFC had not completely vanished; the birth of European sovereign debt crisis (ESDC henceforth) took place. The economic and financial events in late 2009 in Greece may be regarded as the epicenter of the ESDC. Most economies of Europe, such as, France and Spain, were affected by the crisis. Syllignakis and Kouretas (2010) while confirming this point of view substantiate that GFC had a critical effect on the convergence of stock markets of Central and Eastern Europe as they were partially integrated with the mature US stock markets.
Despite much research on the subject little consensus is found on a single definition of contagion. For example, Eichengreen and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define contagion as a situation where the information of crisis at one place increases the probability of domestic crisis elsewhere. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduced the concept of "Shift-Contagion" and defined it as "a significant increase in cross market linkages after a shock to an individual country (or group of countries)". Gravelle et al. (2006) further formalized this idea and the term "Shift-Contagion" started gaining popularity. Distinction between interdependency and contagion has important implications for researchers, investors and the policy makers. High levels of correlation between two variables during normal period may represent interdependence but the same situation may represent contagion if a significant shift in correlations is observed. We base our analysis on the definition of contagion as proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) .
In literature, we find the application of time varying conditional correlations between stock market returns, exchange rates returns, credit default swaps among many other financial variables to distinguish the stable and the crisis period. This methodology became widely used after the seminal work of Engle (2002) 1 . Most of the research based on the model of Engle (2002) (now on as DCCE) and its various flavors revolve around the Asian financial crisis or the GFC e.g. Chiang et al. (2007) use the DCCE model to study the dynamic conditional correlations among nine Asian stock market returns from 1990 to 2003. They identify two phases of Asian crisis; first phase exhibits the contagion phenomenon whereas the second phase is characterized by herding (continued high correlations). Kuper and Lestano (2007) also apply the same model to daily data from March 3, 1995 to December 31, 2001 to study the dynamic correlations among the stock markets, the markets for foreign exchange and the money markets in Indonesia and Thailand during the Asian crisis. They observe no contagion between Thailand and Indonesia. Cheung et al. (2008) employ the same model on the stock market returns of U.S. and 11 EMEAP 2 economies while using weekly data to study the contagion effect of GFC. They use t-test to compare the means of the dynamic correlations to assess the contagion behavior and find no contagion between U.S. and 11 EMEAP economies but witness intra-regional contagion. They attribute this to indiscriminate treatment of regional markets by investors while facing common external shocks. This paper studies the changes in the dynamics of conditional correlation of stock market returns of 16 OECD countries in times of crisis vis-à-vis tranquil period. Stock market data is used to study shift-contagion due to the fact that the stock market reactions could be triggered by the exchange rate dynamics followed by sovereign debt signals (Phylaktis & Ravazzolo, 2005) . We analyze the contagion effect of two recent crises i.e. GFC and ESDC, by applying a robust technique of Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlations (ADCC henceforth) introduced by Cappiello et al. (2006) . ADCC GARCH helps to alleviate the dimensionality issue, and incorporates asymmetric impact of negative and positive shocks on the correlations. Moreover, the use of GARCH models for estimating correlations also overcomes the problem of heteroscedasticity of Pearson correlation coefficient raised by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . We avoid the application of DCC model by Engle (2002) due to inconsistency problem with the DCC estimators as identified by Aielli (2013) . To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first of its kind, in terms, of addressing the GFC and ESDC simultaneously by applying the ADCC EGARCH model on a huge data set of 16 OECD stock markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the data, descriptive statistics and a little discussion on key dates of crisis. Section 4 contains our empirical analysis of the results whilst Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
METHODOLOGY
We organize our study in three stages. At first stage we fit a univariate GARCH model to each series of stock returns 4 . At second stage, we estimate multivariate ADCC model of Cappiello et al. (2006) between the U.S and 15 OECD stock markets, and between Greece and 14 OECD stock markets. This is in contrast to Yiu et al (2010) and Tamakoshi et al. (2012) , where they use a bi-variate framework. The advantage of using a multivariate ADCC lies in the fact that we can simultaneously estimate the pair-wise correlation coefficients for the stock market returns and study the phenomena of contagion (Syllignakis & Kouretas, 2011 ). Finally, we estimate an AR(1) model on the dynamic correlation with two dummy variable representing the GFC and ESDC. Each stage is further elaborated as under:
EGARCH Model Estimation (Stage 1)
We estimate a mean equation to retrieve the residuals needed to model variance equation; hence returns can be described by the following process: Nelson (1991), introduced Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) which has advantage over the plain vanilla GARCH, as it permits good news and bad news to have a different impact on volatility by allowing bad news to have greater impact on volatility. The EGARCH model works in two steps, first it considers mean and then variance, it can be defined as: 
ADCC Model Estimation (Stage 2)
We estimate asymmetric DCC model developed by Cappiello et al. (2006) to derive the time-varying conditional correlations. We denote the standardized regression mentioned above as:
To capture asymmetric impacts, the negative standardized residuals are defined by
Then by depicting the dynamics of conditional correlation matrix denoted by t P , and unconditional correlation matrix between residuals denoted by P , the asymmetric DCC (1, 1) model is represented as: 
AR(1) Model Estimation (Stage 3)
At this last stage, we apply an Autoregression (AR) model, with one lag and two dummy variables representing the GFC and the ESDC, on asymmetric dynamic conditional correlations to check for the hypothesis that GFC and ESDC have significant impact on the dynamics of correlations between the U.S. stock market and each of 15 OECD markets on one hand, and Greece stock market and each of 14 OECD stock markets on the other. The AR(1) model is presented as under:
THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We Sweden, U.K, Australia, Japan, and Greece). We use weekly returns to preserves the adequacy of data and avoid the market microstructure biases at daily frequencies. Further, equity indices are obtained in U.S. dollars to avoid the influence of country specific factors such as inflation and at the same time incorporate exchange rate fluctuations in our study.
Analyzing crisis requires understanding of the chronological events that shape up the crisis. It is difficult to come out with a unanimous agreement on the periods of GFC and ESDC, therefore we base our analysis on the chronology of events as given in the literature. The date of the GFC is based upon the study of Aït-Sahalia et al. Table 1 . It is interesting to note that the mean returns of the weekly data were negative for most of the countries for both the crisis except for U.S. and Sweden 5 . In U.S, the returns are negative for GFC but positive during the ESDC whereas for Sweden the returns were positive for GFC but negative for ESDC. As expected, there is increase in standard deviation during both crisis periods for all the countries. The returns are characterized by negative skewness during both the crisis except for Australia which is positively skewed during the ESDC. Further the returns exhibit excess kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera statistics are significant for all return series and hence rejects the assumption of normality. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

EGARCH Model Estimation (Stage 1)
In 
ADCC Model Estimation (Stage 2)
The estimated parameter of standardized residuals ( a ), and the parameter of innovation in the dynamics of For Greece and each of 14 OECD stock markets, the mean parameters are also statistically significant at 1% level. The shocks in Greece stock market impact the Spain stock market (0.086) the most as shown in Figure 2 and the Denmark stock market (0.034) the least, whereas Greece stock market approximately equally impacts Sweden and Finland stock markets (.071). The dummy variables for GFC ( 1  ) and ESDC ( 2  ) for AR(1) models on the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlations between U.S. and each of 15 OECD countries reveal some interesting results. The parameter estimates for the GFC are all statistically significant at 10% significance level except for the Ireland and Sweden stock markets whereas the parameter estimates for the ESDC are also mostly significant except for Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Japan, and Greece. The non significance of the estimates of ESDC dummy variable reveals that there was no contagion from Greece to U.S. This may due to the fact that U.S banks have little direct exposure amounting to $7.3 billion to Greece. The significance of remaining 10 OECD countries may be attributed to the after effect of the GFC and the probability of default by U.S in July-August 2011, rather than directly attributing it to the events in Greece. Our finding reconfirm most of the research on GFC contagion on advanced economies of the world as already discussed in the text.
The parameter estimates of the dummy variables for GFC ( 1  ) 6 and ESDC ( 2  ) for AR(1) models on the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlations between Greece and each of the 14 OECD countries are almost non significant except for Canada and Italy which are significant at 10% significance level for the GFC dummy. This enables us to deduce the notion of no strong evidence of contagion effects on OECD stock markets due the economic and financial events in Greece. Three important reasons may be put forward to support our findings. First, Greece being a comparatively small economy 7 has negligible impact on rest of the OECD member countries (e.g Nelson et al., 2011, p. 2). Second, the crisis in European countries mainly emerged from domestic mishandling of unsustainable levels of public debt (e.g. in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), hence economic and financial events in one country may not substantial impact other countries. Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2010) provide similar explanation; they find that the financial institutions are heavily burdened by the sovereign debt of the domestic country. Third, international monetary institutions such as European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were quick enough in responding to crisis in each country and prevented them from spreading to other countries in the region (Neslon et al., 2011, p. 5). Our result contradicts that of Tamakoshi and al. (2012) . This contradiction is mainly because of two methodological issues. First, they use daily stock market returns which may incorporate market microstructure biases (e.g. Kenourgios et al., 2011) . Second, they take a dataset of stock market returns of seven European countries including that of U.K whose opening and closing times do not match with rest of the countries and hence may induce contemporaneous mean relations between the markets.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates shift-contagion among 16 OECD member economies during global financial crisis (2008-2009) and European sovereign debt crisis (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . To this end, we apply asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model developed by Cappiello et al. (2006) in a multivariate frame work. Our results provide interesting results. First, our results reconfirm the impact of shift-contagion in most of the advanced countries of the world as presented in the literature. Second, we find no strong evidence of shift-contagion during the European sovereign debt crisis. This may be attributed to comparatively small magnitude of Greek economy in the world, the crisis in European countries originate and impact the domestic economies, and lastly, international financial institutions such as IMF and ECB were efficient in responding to the country specific needs at times of default and 6 The dummy variable is introduced for GFC between the dynamic correlations of Greece and each of OECD country to perform robust test to observe if the methodology under consideration reveals expected results. We do not expect to observe any significant shifts between the dynamic correlations of Greece and each of OECD during GFC. 7 42nd economy in the world and contributes a paltry 3% to the GDP of European Union.
